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1 
Abstract 
Intuitively, anarchism and republicanism are miles apart. This essay shows that they are more 
connected then often thought. It sketches the republican tradition and places the anarchistic 
philosophy of Proudhon in a republican light. It shows the similarities between Proudhon’s 
anarchism and republicanism by examining republican themes in the work of Proudhon. 
Themes like rule of law, separation of powers and decentralization. It will show that 
Proudhon’s system of anarchy is a viable form of state that deserves its place in the republican 
tradition. When viewed as a viable form of state, it will also find its way into the mixed 
constitution. 
  
 
2 
Introduction 
When there is no common power to keep us all in awe, the life of men will be “solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short.”1 Men, so it seems, cannot live in freedom without 
government (the power that keeps us all in awe). It is exactly this statement that anarchists 
deny. They claim that government is simply a tool of the rich and powerful to suppress the 
masses. The problem that is faced is called “the elite problem”. How can the rulers be stopped 
from misusing their power? Who guards the guardians? Traditionally, there are two ways of 
dealing with this problem. The first is the moral education of the leaders and is championed 
by Plato, the second is the separation of powers in a mixed constitution developed by James 
Madison. Interestingly enough the anarchist Proudhon doesn’t specifically use any of the two.  
This thesis will try to shed a new light on Proudhon by placing his political thought in 
the republican tradition. This approach is relatively new. Prichard places Proudhon in a 
republican light when he addresses the international situation. This thesis will focus on the 
national level. The central question of this thesis therefore is: how can freedom be defended 
from tyranny within the modern state from an anarchic perspective? 
 To answer this question the political philosophy of Proudhon will be explained and 
placed in the context of the republican tradition. The republican tradition has always been 
interested in defending freedom from oppression and Proudhon’s insights might prove very 
useful for this line of thinking. It will be an attempt to bring Proudhon anarchism within the 
scope of republicanism. Though intuitively this may seem impossible, this is not in fact the 
case and the results will be shown to be promising. At the very least it will provide a better 
view of what it means to be an anarchist. 
In chapter 1 I will discuss how the government can be made to be non-tyrannical 
based on the republican tradition. Keeping the government at bay is not an easy task. It took 
two and a half thousand years to get where we are now and we have not yet arrived at a just 
society that is free from tyranny. The path through these two and a half thousand years will be 
illuminated. It will be a historical journey through the republican thoughts of Thucydides, 
Aristotle, Polybius, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and the authors of the Federalist Papers. 
In chapter 2 the philosophy of Proudhon will be explored. This chapter will inquire 
about the nature of property and the state. Proudhon’s ideas about anarchy will be shown to be 
very different from what is traditionally labelled as anarchy. The federalist mutualist state will 
be studied here. 
In chapter 3 I will discuss the elements of republican thought that can be found in 
Proudhon’s work. When the state is a necessary institution, how can it best be framed? To 
answer this question republicans have come up with multiple tools to frame a just state. Are 
those tools also present in Proudhon’s anarchy? I will examine republican themes in the work 
of Proudhon like the rule of law, separation of powers, the idea of the state and 
decentralization. I will also point out that the non-republican themes that feature Proudhon’s 
work can be found in classical republican thinkers. 
 In chapter 4 I will draw lessons from Proudhon’s anarchistic view by assessing them 
critically. Proudhon’s ideas about property, the nature of men and the federalist mutualist state 
                                                          
1
 Hobbes, Leviathan,  p. 89 
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will be criticized. It will show that Proudhon’s ideal society might be able to survive these 
critiques and therefore should be considered as a viable state. This has serious consequences 
for the republican tradition. 
The thesis will be concluded with an answer to the central question. It will conclude 
with the notion that although Proudhon has a system of his own, he does to a large extend fit 
in the republican tradition. His ideas of a federalist mutualist state add another form of state to 
tradition. Also his analysis of property enriches the republican tradition.  
 
.  
 
 
  
 
4 
1. Republican Virtue 
The origins of republicanism 
To place Proudhon in a republican sphere, first the republican tradition needs to be presented. 
This chapter will follow a chronological order, organized by thinker. This is to make sure that 
the republican themes stay within their original framework as much as possible. 
 The key idea behind republicanism is the idea that no man should be subject to the 
arbitrary power of another. Ideals like freedom, rule of law, the mixed constitution and 
separation of powers are closely related to republicanism. In this chapter the focus will be on 
arbitrary power of the government. This fear of arbitrary power is not new to our era but is 
known throughout history, and men have been trying to find a way of government that can 
coexist with the liberty of men. One of these solutions is the mixed government which can be 
traced back to Thucydides. 
 
1.1 Thucydides 
In “de Peloponnessische oorlog” Thucydides (460-400 BC.), a Greek historian, first describes 
something like a mixed constitution. He describes the constitution of Athens as an excellent 
constitution because it was a constitution where both the needs of the elite and the masses 
where recognized.
2
 It is known as the reign of the five thousand.
3
 The five thousand replaced 
the oligarchy of the four hundred. By enlarging the ruling class the Athenian government 
became a lot more democratic.
4
 Neither the elites, nor the masses should be able to suppress 
the other. Thucydides favors a balanced constitution. For him this would mean the balance 
between the ruling elites and the masses. 
 
1.2Aristotle 
Aristotle (384-322 BC.) describes three types of states as good states: Monarchy, Aristocracy 
and Politeia. These three states each have a corrupted version.
5
 The monarch can become a 
tyrant, the aristocrat can become an oligarch and the politeia will turn into a democracy. The 
total number of types of states comes to six.
6
 Of these six, the politeia is the best form of 
government. 
 The ideal state (the politeia) is a tool that is used to lift citizens to a higher level.
7
 The 
highest level that a human being can obtain is the state of eudaimonia (wellbeing).
8
 A state of 
eudaimonia can be achieved by (a lot of) philosophical contemplation and virtuous actions.
9
 
This higher level cannot be obtained by every human being in society so a large amount of 
them (slaves and workers) are excluded.
10
 Slaves and workers share less in reason than other 
                                                          
2
 Thucydides, De Peloponnesische oorlog, p. 782. Book 8, 97. 
3
 Thucydides, De Peloponnesische oorlog, p. 782. Book 8, 97. 
4
 Gustav Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiquities, p 158-159. 
5
 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 246. 
6
 Plato, Aristotle’s teacher, also describes six types of states but unlike Aristotle he recognizes timocracy and 
does not know politeia. 
7
 Aristoteles, Politica, p. 275. 1323 a 15. 
8
 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 82. 
Laurens ten Cate, Encyclopedie van de filosofie, p.36. 
9
 Aristoteles, Politica, p. 281 1325 a 31. Eudaimonia is an activity. 
10
 E. Barker, The political thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 418. 
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more sophisticated men. For workers and slaves it is best to be governed by the learned and 
wise. The simpletons are the tools to build the ideal polis, not the end of it. The state takes 
care of education, the food supply, the army, religion and matters of good and evil.
11
 The 
ideal state provides for both the material as well as the immaterial wellbeing of its citizens. 
The leadership of the state consists of old military officials. The younger men serve in the 
army and when they are old and wise enough they will become the leaders.
12
 
 Though there is a significant difference between the human beings that are citizens and 
those who are not, the ideal state of Aristotle shares in democratic ideals. Citizens are equal 
and share equally in property.
13
 All citizens will receive an education to ensure that the state 
reaches its goal of lifting its citizens to a higher level.
14
 In this sense the ideal state is a mix of 
democracy and aristocracy. No man should be ruled by their lesser.
15
 
 
1.3 Polybius 
The mixed constitution takes a more complete form in the writings of Polybius (200-118 
B.C.). In his work “The Histories” he describes the rise of the Roman Empire. He argues that 
the superiority of the Roman Empire was due to its superior constitution. In Polybius political 
philosophy all states follow a natural cycle of decline.
16
 Polybius starts with a good king who 
will eventually become a tyrant. If it is not the good king then his son is very likely to become 
a tyrant. No king can be sure of good offspring. The noble and the brave will not submit to a 
tyrant and start a resistance.
17
 They will throw out the king and establish an aristocracy. The 
nobles are very aware of the evils that took place under despotic government so they will rule 
wisely. Their sons however, who are not familiar with the horrors of a tyrant will not be so 
kind to the people and start to become tyrants themselves. They will focus on gaining wealth 
and not on leading the country.
18
 The aristocracy will become an oligarchy. The people will 
not accept this and will drive out the oligarchs establishing a democracy. The people are 
aware that both monarchy and aristocracy will decline into their corrupted counterpart so they 
place the power of the state in their own hands. They will create a democracy. Due to 
lawlessness and license this democracy will eventually decline into mob-rule (ochlocracy).
19
 
Just like Aristotle, Polybius sees three good kinds of government.
20
 Unlike Aristotle, 
democracy is one of them. In themselves each of these states are doomed to fail. Polybius 
comes with an interesting solution to the problem of decline. The best constitution is a 
constitution that has all three of the good types of government in it.
21
 
 Polybius describes the mixed constitution of the Roman Empire as follows. The head 
of state is the consul. The consul is the executive branch, who leads the troops and 
                                                          
11
 E. Barker, The political thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 417. 
12
 E. Barker, The political thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 419. 
13
 E. Barker, The political thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 422 
14
 Aristoteles, Politica, p. 290. 1328 a 36 
15
 Aristoteles, Politica, p. 254. 1318 b 34 - 1319 a 5 
16
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 351. 
17
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 353 
18
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 354. 
19
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 350. 
20
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 350. 
21
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 350. “For it is plain that we must regard as the best 
constitution that which partakes of all these three elements.” 
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corresponds to the monarchy.
22
 The senate is in charge of the empire’s finances and makes the 
laws.
23
 This element of the state corresponds to the aristocracy. The democratic element can 
be found in the courts that are made up of the people.
24
 The courts also have a veto to block 
laws that they find repulsive.
25
 This way the government is split in three with no way for any 
of the branches to gain absolute power. The consul cannot become a tyrant because the senate 
and the courts have the power to stop him. The same counts for the senate that cannot turn 
oligarchic because the courts will veto oligarchic laws. The people cannot decline into mob-
rule when the senate and consul do their jobs. 
Thucydides and Aristotle described the mixed constitution as a mix between 
aristocracy and democracy. Polybius goes further by dividing the government in three distinct 
units. Each of these branches of government could be identified with a specific kind of good 
government. Polybius develops the idea of a mixed constitution. Unlike Aristotle, Polybius 
prescribes a specific part of government to a specific way of ruling it. 
 
1.4 Machiavelli 
For many thinkers the Roman Empire is a source of inspiration. One of the thinkers who 
heavily drew on the lessons of Rome is Machiavelli (1469–1527).  
Anyone who reads Machiavelli’s The Prince will see that it cannot be further away from the 
ideal of republicanism. To deceive, to rob, to murder, everything is permitted as long as it 
keeps the prince in power.
26
 To be called an example of Machiavellianism is not a 
compliment. 
In the Discorsi Machiavelli shows a different side of himself. Instead of teaching how 
to rule, mercilessly when necessary, he takes the Roman history as delivered by Livius, and 
tries to draw lessons from its dealings to improve the situation of Florence. 
 Machiavelli follows Polybius in his views on anacyclosis and the mixed 
constitution. The best constitution is similar to Rome’s.27 The decline of the Roman Empire 
started with the first emperor Caesar. It was because of the absolute rulers that the Romans 
were no longer free people. This freedom was the core of the Roman power, and is the result 
of friction between the nobility and the people.
28
This is because the will of the people is more 
stable than that of the monarch.
29
 It also places more emphasis on public interest and not on 
private interest.
30
  
Machiavelli stresses the importance of a judiciary that is open to every citizen. It is 
important that anyone can be brought before the court and that the courts will judge according 
to the law.
31
 Even the rulers should be subject to the law, and should be able to be brought 
before the courts. It is important that the rulers obey their own laws. Although Machiavelli 
                                                          
22
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 357. 
23
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 357. 
24
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 358. 
25
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 360. 
26
 Machiavelli,  The Prince, p, 58. 
27
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 115. 1.6. 
28
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 103. 1.4. 
29
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 259. 1.59. 
30
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 267. 2.2 
31
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 121. 1.8. 
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does not use the phrase rule of law it is important in his political thought.
32
 Even when the 
Romans made use of a dictator, the dictator was still bound by certain laws.
33
 
 Unlike the tradition he builds upon, Machiavelli sees more virtue in the people than in 
the nobility or the monarchy.
34
 In this sense Machiavelli shows strong democratic tendencies. 
The Romans were sure of good leadership because they were able to select the best.
35
 He 
praises the Roman people for their virtue, but he also acknowledges the lack of virtue in the 
peoples of his time. This is part due to the lack of religion. Religious virtues are of vital 
importance to a state. Though they should be used with some flexibility, any state that lacks 
them is sure to fall into decline.
36
 Men are not born with virtue, so they need religion to 
educate them in moral matters.
37
 
He also emphasizes the idea of countervailing powers. The Roman dictator was still 
bound by the laws and could be stopped.  The Senate, consuls and tribunes formed the 
countervailing power.
38
 No power should be without a power to keep it in check.
39
 How this 
should be done is left open in his work, but others have successfully found solutions. 
 
1.5 Montesquieu 
Montesquieu’s (1689-1755) work (De L’esprit des lois) knows many similarities with 
Polybius. Just like Machiavelli before him, Montesquieu draws heavily on the Roman 
tradition. There are however very important differences between Montesquieu and his 
predecessors. Montesquieu separates the state in three parts, but does not base this on 
monarchical, aristocratic or democratic tendencies.
40
  According to Montesquieu there are 
three powers within the state. Two of these are executive and one is legislative. The two 
executive powers consist of executive power for foreign and interior affairs. The government 
branch for interior affairs is also known as the judiciary power. Here we see the executive, 
legislative and judiciary power that are known today. It is vital that these three powers are 
kept separate, for tyranny looms when they fall into one hand.
41
 
He states: “Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative and executive.”42 
 Of the three powers, it is the judiciary power that is the most dangerous for 
individuals. This is because the judiciary targets individuals while the legislative and 
executive are aimed at society as a whole. Montesquieu argues that the judiciary must be 
made invisible by making sure that the courts have no permanent seating. They are to be 
dissolved when they are no longer necessary. This is very different from Polybius and 
                                                          
32
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 146. 1.16 
33
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 182. 1.34 
34
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 147. 1.58.”Daar kan maar één reden voor zijn, het bewind van een volk is beter dan 
het bewind van een vorst.” 
35
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 155. 1.20. 
36
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 133. 1.11. 
37
 Machiavelli cites Dante in: Dante,  The devine Comedy, p. 191. Canto 7 : 121 
38
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 185. 1.35. 
39
 Machiavelli, Discorsi, p. 185. 1.35. 
40
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 1. 
41
 Anthony Kenny,  A new history of Western Philosophy, p. 721. 
      Laurens ten Cate, Encyclopedie van de filosofie, p. 360. 
42
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 1. 
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Machiavelli. However, like Polybius and Machiavelli the judges should be made up of 
citizens. 
 The legislative power will consist of a parliament that will consist of representatives of 
the people. Representatives are necessary since it is impossible in large nation-states to 
include the entire population in the lawmaking process. Even if this possible it is still better to 
use representatives because most people lack the knowledge to fruitfully participate in 
lawmaking.
43
 The representatives are selected by election. Every adult that is eighteen years 
or older has a right to vote unless they are not mentally capable.
44
 The legislative power will 
not only consist of chosen representatives but also of nobility. The senate will be separated in 
two chambers, one for the chosen representatives of the people and one for the nobility. The 
nobility takes no part in the deliberation but is armed with a veto.
45
 This means the nobility 
cannot write the law, but it can prevent certain laws from being passed. Unlike in Polybius, it 
is the nobility that has the veto and not the people. 
 The executive power will be in the hands of a monarch. He has the capability to stop 
the legislative power to make laws that give it absolute power. The monarch decides when the 
legislature assembles and for how long.
46
  
 This way all three powers are firmly separated from each other but also connected by 
veto rights. The key concept is the separation of powers and less the balance of powers. This 
is something that is more prominent in the works of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and 
John Jay.  
 
1.6 Federalist Papers 
Together with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton James Madison writes The Federalist Papers 
(1787). The Federalist Papers are a collection of newspaper articles that are meant to convince 
the American people to support the constitution. The United States became independent from 
Great-Britain and was in need of its own constitution.
47
 Madison builds upon the ideas of 
Polybius and Montesquieu. He also separates the state in three parts and like Montesquieu he 
recognizes the legislative, the executive and judiciary branch of government. These three 
branches need to be separated from each other. They need to create a will of their own. In this 
sense Madison goes even further then Montesquieu in separating the three powers. By 
creating a will of their own each power gains the ambition to keep the other powers in check. 
In Madison’s words: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”48 This is only possible 
when the powers are not only separated from each other but also dependent on each other. 
Their ambition will make sure that none of the powers will accept encroachment by the other 
powers. The idea of checks and balances take a central role in balancing the constitution.
49
 
 The constitution that is defended in The Federalist Papers is a presidential constitution. 
Since Madison has a democracy in mind, the core of the political power lies with the people.
50
 
                                                          
43
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 3. 
44
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 3. 
45
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 4. 
46
 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, chapter  6, p. 5. 
47
 Ian Crofton,  50 Inzichten Geschiedenis, p. 110. 
48
 James Madison,  The Federalist Papers, no 51. 
49
 James Madison,  The Federalist Papers, no 51. 
50
 Barry Goldwater,  The conscience of a conservative, p. 22. 
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The executive power, the president, is chosen by the people. The fact that the president is 
chosen makes sure that he is firmly in power. He is not dependent on the other powers to get 
him in office. He is democratically chosen and when he doesn’t do his job he will not be re-
elected. Also the president is armed with a veto to block all legislation that he deems wrong. 
Only when there is a two-third majority in favor of the law, then the president is not able to 
use its veto. The president himself does not make laws. The only way for him to create law is 
through a senator. The president also has the ability to dissolve the senate. 
 The legislative branch is, according to Madison, the strongest of the three powers. The 
legislative power takes the form of a senate and is elected by the people. Both the legislative 
and the executive power are democratically legitimated. To check the strength of the 
legislative power the executive power, the president, was reinforced with a veto. Madison 
believes this was not enough so the legislative power is split in two. There is a house of 
representatives that consists of delegates from the states, and a senate that consists of chosen 
representatives.
51
 The legislative power controls the budget. Apart from the possibility of 
impeachment, where the president is removed from office, there is no way for the legislative 
power to remove the president.
52
 
 The judicial power is meant as a check against both the legislative and the executive 
power but the judiciary power itself remains unchecked. This is because, in sharp contrast to 
Montesquieu, the judiciary is the weakest of the three. The president has the power of the 
sword, the legislative power that of the purse and the judiciary only has its words. A verdict is 
useless when it is not enforced. The check, that the judiciary has against the other two powers, 
is that of judicial review. The Supreme Court can declare laws to be unconstitutional and 
therefore void.
53
 This power is meant to correct mistakes. When laws are passed that take 
away freedoms promised by the constitution the Supreme Court can intervene. 
 The constitution, described above, functions as the US constitution today.
54
 The mixed 
constitution must guard against encroachment of governmental power on the freedom of the 
individual. This freedom is in grave danger when the power of the government is not 
separated. 
 Republican virtues have been developed over two and a half centuries. Many thinkers 
have contributed to this process, though their whole philosophy may differ. Some are 
monarchist, some are more democratic, others more aristocratic, they still find each other in 
these themes.
55
 It is in this light that Proudhon will be placed in the republican tradition. 
Though he might not at his core have been a republican, he still has republican values in his 
work and his way of dealing with them may prove to be valuable for the republican 
tradition.
56
 In the next chapter the philosophy of Proudhon will be examined. 
 
                                                          
51
 James Madison,  The Federalist Papers, no 62. 
52
 Article 4 section II of the US constitution. 
53
 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, no 78. 
54
 There are a few changes. Slavery is abolished and a president can only be re-elected once. The idea of checks 
and balances however is still the same. 
55
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 12. 
56
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 13. 
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2. The philosophy of Proudhon 
What is property? 
In his work “Property is theft!” Proudhon (1809-1865) opens the attack on property, which, 
in his eyes, is the root of all evil.
57
 Property is the excommunication of all mankind.
58
 In this 
day and age it might be very hard, if not impossible, to imagine a world without property. One 
might think of forms of communism where all property belongs to the state or a situation 
where all kind of strangers can walk through your living room. This is not what Proudhon has 
in mind. 
 According to Proudhon the right of property as we know it today is in need of a 
foundation, that cannot be found. The right of property must be founded somewhere, and 
wherever an author has made a claim he has found it, Proudhon shows that he in fact did not. 
 
2.1 The difference between property and possession 
The core problem with property lies in its confusion with possession. Property is a 
right, possession is a fact.  A farmer who works the lands is the possessor, while the owner 
who lends the land to him is the proprietor. Property is an evil, while private possession is a 
blessing.
59
 The key difference between property and possession is described by Proudhon as 
such: “(..)a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor.”60 In a good marriage the husband 
(and also the wife) is a lover, and in a bad (perhaps worthless) marriage the husband and wife 
are not. In the same way a healthy relationship of men and matter is possession and a bad one 
is property. The connection between men and matter is stronger and more direct in the case of 
possession than in the case of property. 
Now, what is property? The Dutch civil code describes it as the most inclusive right a 
person can have. From this right derives a whole range of other rights. Property nowadays 
includes a use right, the right to use to product. It includes the right of alienation, the right to 
sell the product or transfer it to someone else. It includes the right of usufruct, the right to 
draw fruits from the product. It also includes the right of exclusion, the right to keep others of 
the product. Finally it also includes the right of modification, to alter the product in the way 
the owner likes it. But Proudhon, however, does not just question what we mean by property, 
he is more interested in the foundation of the right of property. Proudhon believes that this 
foundation cannot be found, and attacks writers who claim they found it. It is important to 
keep the difference between possession and property in mind since Proudhon believes that 
possession does have a foundation. 
 Many writers have founded the right of property on a natural right. They claim 
that property comes from first occupation. There are a number of problems with this idea, 
when the current practice of property is considered. In the first place, the whole idea of a 
natural right implies that it should be equal amongst all. We all have the same right to 
                                                          
57
 Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 107. 
See also, Diogenes Laertius, The lives of eminent philosophers, p. 53 Diogenes 50. “The love of money he 
declared to be mother-city of all evils.” 
58
 Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 95. 
Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 104 
59
 Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 150.  
60
 Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 91. 
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property. Given the finite characteristics of the planet this is an impossibility. Later 
generations do not share in the same right as their predecessors. They will find the world 
occupied. The natural right theory does not hold here. 
Proudhon also answers with Cicero who claims that the world is like a theater.
61
 
Everyone is free to take a seat where he pleases. This seat is his for the duration of the show. 
He can claim any empty seat, but he is limited in the sense that he cannot claim more than he 
needs. He cannot claim two seats, or an entire row. This idea of property is compatible with 
possession, but not with property as we know it.  The idea of property that is used today is 
perfectly compatible with taking more than one seat. Proudhon points out that Cicero has a 
different idea of private property then what is meant by it today. 
When every human has a natural right of occupancy then the world must be divided 
among all the people of the world. Every time the number of people changes, the amount of 
matter that a person has a right to changes.
62
 Justice would demand it. This would be very 
impractical. It will make occupation subordinated to population. The right by occupancy can 
thus never remain fixed and never develop into property.
63
 Occupation thus, is not the 
foundation of property. 
So for Proudhon it is clear that property does not come from a natural right in 
combination with first occupancy. The only thing this theory can support is possession. 
Other writers have proposed property as a natural right associated with labor. Property 
is the fruit of your labor. This theory does also not support the way property is used today.
64
 
In the case of a worker who puts his labor in a product, the wages he will receive are always 
less than the value of the products he creates. If he would receive the exact value, there would 
be no profits.
65
 Also, the value of labor rises when more laborers are put to work due to the 
added value of their cooperation.
66
 Their collective force is greater than the sum of their 
numbers. If this is not being taken into account, the worker is robbed.
67
 Proudhon describes 
this collective force as a collective property, and as collective property it should be enjoyed 
by the collective and not by the few who can deploy it.
68
 The system of wage labor alienates 
the worker from his labor and also alienates society from collective labor.
69
 This alienation of 
collective labor and the appropriation of its value by the capitalist, the proprietors, is a war on 
mankind.
70
 The worker does not enjoy the fruits of his labor. 
Another problem arises when considering land as property. The creator of the land is 
God Almighty, or, if you are not religious, the creator is unknown. Land cannot be claimed as 
property, since no one’s labor has created it. Also the work and skill that the laborer put in the 
ground do not give him a title to the ground itself. It only gives title to the products the ground 
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produces.
71
 Since land can never be appropriated, the renting of land becomes problematic. 
There can be no title to charge rent to a farmer who works the fields.
72
 The farmer, putting his 
work in the soil has more right, based on the theory of labor as the source of property, to the 
fruits of the soil than anyone else.
73
 Did the landowner receive a title to those fruits as a result 
of his labor?
74
 If he did not, then he cannot claim property right based on labor. The land 
cannot be held in property based on labor. 
Proudhon also points to the problematic nature of accession, succession and donation 
in relation to labor. The receiver did not labor but still gains the product and his relation to the 
product is defined as property.
75
 
Labor can only be successfully used as foundation when property is seen as 
possession. Property and labor cannot coexist peacefully. In a system of property the laborer 
will receive less than the value of his labor. So property suppresses labor. When labor is the 
base for property it will destroy property, since it can only coexist with possession.  
From the perspective of equality property becomes a problem. Just like the air we 
breathe and the water we drink, labor and land are necessities for life. As such, humans have 
an equal right to them and labor and land cannot be appropriated.
76
 From necessity comes the 
right.
77
 Proudhon’s position to property can be described as follows: “Corner-stone of all 
which is, stumbling-block of all which ought to be,-- such is property.”78 
 
2.1Proudhon’s anarchy 
Human beings are associated with each other, they are political animals.
79
Creating 
communities lies in the nature of mankind.
80
 The term anarchy, often used to describe a 
situation in which there is no state, seems to contradict this. Proudhon calls himself an 
anarchist and still holds that men are associated with one another. What does this anarchy 
look like? 
One of the first political thinkers who describes anarchy is Plato.
81
 According to Plato, 
anarchy is the worst state a nation can be in. The one who yells the loudest or caries the 
heaviest weapon is boss. There is no order, there is no authority. In the scene of chaos the 
people will suffer and wish for a strong leader to bring order back to society.
82
 This man, 
coming from a chaotic population, who needs to rule over uneducated fools, will become a 
tyrant. Anarchy isn’t a form of state like aristocracy or democracy; it is a situation that comes 
from the failure of democracy which transforms it into a tyranny.
83
 It is a passing phase that 
will result in despotism. This state of anarchy knows many similarities with the state of nature 
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in Hobbes. Hobbes points out that there is no industry or craft in the state of nature.
84
 Many 
things that will make life pleasurable will not exist in either Plato or Hobbes’ anarchy. Both 
are terrible states to live in, and need to be abandoned as soon as possible. Both will result in a 
strong leader or Leviathan who will restore order but not necessarily justice. A Hobbesian 
state of nature, where the life of men is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short”, is also a 
state of anarchy.
85
 Described as such, nobody in his right mind would want to live in 
anarchy.
86
 
 Still, Proudhon describes himself as an anarchist.
87
 This is only possible because the 
idea of anarchy in Proudhon is completely different from that of Plato and Hobbes.
88
 
Proudhon does not completely do away with the state. The state of anarchy is ruled by reason 
and not by men.
89
 Since every man shares in reason, every man is part of the legislative power 
of government. Proudhon, who follows Plato and Aristotle in this, believes that ruling is a 
techné, a skill.
90
 The laws of the nation must be found by reason and science. What is 
reasonable and just can be scientifically tested. Every member of society can share his opinion 
on what is just, but only the nation can declare it to be law.
91
 
 Proudhon argues that the state (the government), as we know it, is no longer 
necessary. He comes to this conclusion by looking for basis of government. This can be found 
in the protection of individuals. Just like Hobbes, Proudhon sees the creation of the 
government, with its power to coerce by the sword,  as necessary for the protection of 
citizens.  
 However, men are no longer savages who continuously prey on each other.
92
 There is 
however still a division in society.
93
 This division is the division of the strong and the weak. 
This strength or weakness comes down to economic power. They come from the monarchical 
relation between property and worker. The same monarchical relation can be found in 
interest.
94
 The question of economics, of property, of politics and the state, are one and the 
same question.
95
 In order to destroy this division of the strong and the weak, property must be 
changed and interest, just like farm-rent, must be abandoned.
96
 This will create greater 
equality in economic power and by this equality the need for the sword of the state will 
vanish. 
 The organization of men will be realized by labor.
97
 Labor has an organizing power in 
itself. Man will not be thrown back on his own. Also in a moral sense, man will not be left to 
himself. It is science that will provide the moral compass of society.  
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 Proudhon argues for the banishment of the state on the grounds that we no longer need 
it.
98
 Society can guide itself without the aid of representatives.  It is from this position that 
Proudhon rejects the separation of powers. When the people govern themselves no separation 
of powers is needed.
99
Just like the will of a person, the will of the nation is one and 
indivisible.
100
 Proudhon believes in the autonomy and personality of the masses.
101
 
Proudhon’s idea about the autonomy of the masses is very similar to Rousseau’s idea about 
the general will.
102
 Proudhon creates a public me that has a will.
103
 This will becomes an 
object of science which will help shape a just society. 
 In the same way that Proudhon wants to abolish property, by replacing it with a just 
alternative, he also wants to abolish the state.
104
 The state does not disappear completely but is 
transformed into a just institution that looks very different from what would be called a state 
today.  The government is turned on its head and organized bottom up and not top down.
105
 
This government is a federation of small “natural groups”.106 Natural groups are groups like 
trade unions, workers associations, guilds, etc. A group is a collection of individuals that have 
a conscience of themselves as a group. This conscience must be proclaimed and practically 
affirmed.
107
 These groups will have a high level of solidarity with their members.
108
 When a 
group meets these qualifications the group can govern itself. This will be done by direct 
democracy where all the leaders are accountable to the electorate.
109
 This way the people truly 
govern themselves. In this sense the separation of powers becomes interesting again. 
Proudhon doesn’t separate the power itself but he does make sure he creates as many sources 
of power as possible to balance them out. He creates a balance of power by creating as much 
factions as possible and making them mutually dependent on each other.
110
 This way no 
natural group will ever become so strong it can dominate the others. The internal power 
structure of the natural groups will rest on direct accountability to the electorate. 
 The natural groups will form a federation. This federation will take the role that the 
state has today. Its power however, will be very limited. The right of taxation is almost 
completely taken from it. The only taxation that is possible is the tax on products.
111
 It is very 
similar to BTW, a value added tax. In contrast with the modern state the federation does not 
have a real center of power.
112
 The natural groups will only transfer the power to the 
federation which they are willing to transfer. They will receive as much from the state as they 
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are willing to sacrifice to it.
113
 Some central tasks will still be possible but the natural groups 
will always be the stronger party. The rights transferred to the state will be minimal. It is vital 
for Proudhon that there is always a possibility to opt out.
114
 The central government, for as far 
as it exists, does not have the power to enforce anything on the natural groups. The only force 
comes from the law of reason. The laws, found out by reason, can and will be enforced. 
Proudhon is a friend of order, not of chaos.
115
 
 What will keep the federation together is a contract
116
. In contrast with social contract 
thinkers like Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes, Proudhon’s social contract is an actual document 
signed and agreed on by the members of society. The goal of the social contract is similar to 
that of Rousseau. The state should protect the individual with the full common force, while 
the individual should still be as free as he was before.
117
 It seems rational to enter the social 
contract but without a common power the contract will be a dead letter. For Proudhon this 
power will come from reason.
118
 In Proudhon’s ideal society there is no such thing as profit, 
interest and property (only possession). Profit comes from selling a product for more than its 
costs. This means the seller gains a bonus at the expense of the buyer. The buyer moves more 
wealth to the seller than he receives, which means that there is more wealth accumulation in 
the hands of the seller. When this theory is applied to society as a whole, it becomes clear that 
profit is nothing else than moving wealth from one person or group in society to the other. It 
is like moving money from your right hand to your left hand. Society as a whole does not get 
better from profit. In the current state of affairs the world is in, the breaking of contract often 
has a financial element to its reason. In Proudhon’s ideal society this motive is absent. The 
contract is mutual advantageous for other than financial reasons, and the breaking of the 
contract is less likely to happen. Proudhon addresses the free-rider problem by making sure 
there is nothing to gain from breaking the contract and the possibility to opt out.
119
 
 It is the collection of these ideas, possession, rule of reason and federation, that are 
central to Proudhon’s idea about mutualism.120 Men will not be in a state of competition with 
each other but live in harmony. This is done by balancing the natural groups and preventing 
the centralization of government.
121
 It is very similar to Marx’s species being, where man is 
no longer alienated from his labor, property and fellow men.
122
 In this species being man is 
fully emancipated as man and truly free.
123
 He is released from the bonds of feudalism and 
capitalism. 
 In contrast to Marx however, Proudhon is not a communist. In Proudhon’s view 
communism destroys the individuality of men. Communism is an attack on the free will of the 
                                                          
113
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 146. 
114
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 147. 
115
 Proudhon,  Property is theft!, p. 133 
116
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 145. 
117
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 74. 
118
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 145. 
119
 See also: Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 101 chapter 15. Hobbes addresses the fool who does not observe the social 
contract. He finds it rational to break it. 
120
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 154. 
121
 Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 153. 
Prichard, Anarchy, mutualism and the federative principle, p. 138. 
122
 Marx, Het Kapitaal, p 71. 
123
 Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p.75. 
 
16 
people and their morality.
124
 The uniformity that is central to communism is the key problem 
for Proudhon. Both property and communism are rejected. Property is the exploitation of the 
weak by the strong, while communism is the exploitation of the strong by the weak.
125
 The 
thesis property, and the antithesis communism, should both be overcome in a higher synthesis 
namely liberty. In his idea of the mutualist state based on a federation of natural groups 
Proudhon gives expression to this synthesis. 
It might be good to summarize here that Proudhon is an anarchist but still upholds a 
system of order (based on reason). Proudhon also keeps the idea of a government alive in his 
work, albeit a strongly decentralized one. Property becomes possession and the state becomes 
a federation.
126
 There will be a rule of law based on the law of reason which is founded on 
science. Proudhon does not fit in the traditional idea of anarchy. In that sense Proudhon is not 
an anarchist. 
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3. Republicanism in Proudhon 
Proudhon as a republican 
The philosophy explained in chapter 2 seems to be in sharp contrast with the ideals that have 
been expressed in chapter 1. This chapter seeks to bring both of them together by showing 
that Proudhon either advances or transforms the key notions behind republicanism. The pieces 
of the puzzle that at first sight do not seem to fit (the banishment of property and interest), 
will also be shown to fit in republican thought, or, at the very least, are familiar to other 
republican thinkers. 
 
3.1 Government 
The government as we know it today will ultimately need to be banished. In its place will 
arise a federation of natural groups. The banishment of government seems to be in sharp 
contrast with the republican ideal of a just government that does not abuse its power. This is 
not the case. Proudhon wants to get rid of the domination relation of the state, while the 
republicans want the state to stay within its proper domain. Although Proudhon does not 
believe in the service conception of government, the republican conception of government is 
not that far from Proudhon’s ideal.127 Considering the famous quotation of James Madison: 
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls of government would be necessary.”128 
 All that is necessary to move from a mixed government to the banishment of 
government under these maxims would be to state that men are angels. Proudhon does not 
explicitly say men are angels, but he clearly emphasizes the idea that men are no longer 
savages who prey on each other. There is no difference in principle, but they disagree about 
the facts. Both Madison and Proudhon can agree when clarity is gained on the condition of 
mankind. Where men ever to reach the level of the angels, Madison would very likely join 
ranks with Proudhon in abandoning government completely. 
According to Madison, “justice is the end of government”, and,” government is the 
reflection of human nature.”129 This means that justice is not just the object of government, 
but of mankind itself. Mankind employs the government as a tool for justice, but like any 
other tool, it’s efficiency and its effectiveness needs to be evaluated, improved, and when 
necessary, be replaced. 
Replacing government by a federation of natural groups is not as unrepublican as it 
might seem at first glance.
130
 It is an idea that Madison himself hints at when addressing the 
problem of a tyrannical majority. Madison states it as follows: “There are but two ways of 
providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the 
majority — that is, of the society itself, the other, by comprehending in the society so many 
separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the 
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whole very improbable, if not impracticable.”131 Proudhon takes both these options. First by 
acknowledging that the masses have a will of their own and second by dividing government 
over as many natural groups as possible.
132
 While the Madisonian version of balancing groups 
requires a center of power, the Proudhonian version does not. Where the American 
Constitution heavily limits the scope of the central government, such a limitation is not 
necessary for Proudhon.
133
  The center does not have any other power then the natural groups 
would give it, and in the second place the natural groups can always opt out. Where the states 
in the Madisonian view are a bulwark against the central government, they are the source of 
power in Proudhon.
134
 
Proudhon does not believe in the divisibility of power.
135
 This is because in his ideal 
anarchic state there is no government that needs to be divided. It is the rule of society by 
society on the grounds of reason and science. This power does not need to be divided because 
it cannot be turned against society. A government can start to prey on its citizens and destroy 
society, but society itself cannot do so. However, when society is not organized like the ideal 
anarchic state, separation of powers is necessary. All states and government in history have 
failed to create liberty.
136
 They produced the opposite of liberty. Were these systems to 
continue, then the separation of powers is the best of a bad situation. 
The same line of thinking is used when it comes to constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism is the entrenchment of domination by the state over the people. This is very 
contrary to Madison who sees the constitution as a way of defending against government 
tyranny. Proudhon rejects the constitution on the grounds that it protects the power relations 
he seeks to destroy. It is replaced by a social contract that every participating group has 
signed. His idea of law is that it is made by reason. Such laws and lawmakers do not need 
entrenchment since they rest on reason. The rejection of the separation of powers is not a 
strange thing in republicanism either. Both Hegel and Tocqueville do not believe in the mixed 
constitution.
137
 
 Republican thinkers have often argued for decentralized government. The law, even in 
the hands of bad men, is less oppressing when it is executed and interpreted on a local level. 
Alexis de Tocqueville argues that: “Zelfs als de wet onderdrukkend zou zijn, zou de vrijheid 
nog altijd een schuilplaats vinden in de manier waarop de wet wordt uitgevoerd; en de 
meerderheid zou niet kunnen afdalen in de details, noch, zo durf ik te zeggen, in de 
kinderachtigheden van de administratieve tirannie.”138Central government would not bother 
to include the amount of detail necessary to tyrannize the population without the help of the 
local authorities. For this reason it is vital that government is decentralized. When government 
is centralized, despotism of the worst kind looms.
139
 Proudhon argues to apply this idea on a 
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much larger scale. Natural groups are self-governing and ipse facto not dominated by 
centralized powers.
140
 Proudhon takes the republican notion of decentralization very serious 
and advances it into his federalist state. 
The Amish are a present day example of the possibility that a self-governing natural 
group can handle its affairs without government interference. Proudhon imagines a society of 
various natural groups who like the Amish conduct their own affairs. This is very consistent 
with the idea that ruling is a techné. Since circumstances differ in different parts of the nation, 
governing wisely needs to be done by someone who is familiar with the area and the issues 
that concern it.
141
 Decentralization provides better rules while allowing more freedom. 
To summarize: Proudhon separates and balances power not over three branches of 
government but over a plethora of natural groups. He takes the republican idea of 
decentralized power to the extent that there no longer is a center of power. Rather than 
dismissing the republican virtues he transforms them or extends them while keeping his eye 
focused on freedom. 
 
3.2 Rule of law 
Rule of law is an ancient concept to stop the domination by the governing elite over the 
masses. Although rule of law does not take away the possibility of despotic power, it takes 
away from it its arbitrary character, the despot’s favorite tool.142 Binding the government to 
its own laws, creates an atmosphere where the actions of the authorities are predictable. The 
key principle of the rule of law, or rechtsstaat, is that every member of society, the rulers 
included, are equal before the law.
143
 
 Its origins can be traced back to ancient Athens (350 B.C).
144
 In Ancient Athens 
parliament would make two kinds of law: Statutes and Decrees. The Statutes were general 
laws in the same way as we know it today, and Decrees were temporary measures. The 
Athenian constitution was formed by the collection of Statutes. Any Decree that was passed 
needed to be in accordance with the Statutes.
145
 Statutes were first accepted by parliament and 
later approved by the nomothetai, a group of 1001 citizens.
146
 This was to make sure the laws 
would not change too often and arbitrary government power would be impossible. 
The creation of the law was in the hands of male citizens.
147
 Not everybody 
participates in the lawmaking process; women, non-Athenians, slaves and children were 
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excluded. Though the Athenian democracy was a direct democracy, many were excluded in 
the law making process.
148
 Proudhon tries to change this with his notion of the rule of reason. 
Instead of a body of picked men, the entire population is the legislative body. That is, 
when they are right. Similarly Cicero states: “And since right reason is Law, we must believe 
that men have Law also in common with the Gods.”149 
The will of the masses is a subject that can and needs to be studied.
150
 From this study, 
the laws will emerge. They are general laws in the same way as are known today. Though 
they need to be declared by the government, the entire population can write the law.
151
 How 
this notion of law, that needs to be declared by the nation, relates to his idea about federation 
is unclear. General laws mean that the natural groups do not have the possibility to act in 
contradiction to the law. However, if the government only declares general laws and the 
interpretation is left to the natural groups then the problem is smaller. The natural groups are 
still capable of writing laws specific to their group. Like the Decrees they need to be in line 
with the general law declared by the government. Since these laws are found by reason, and 
not by men, there is no authority problem. The laws can be proven to work, or dismissed 
when they don’t.152   
The idea of a rule of reason is not new in political thought. Plato’s philosopher kings should 
do exactly that.
153
 They should use their wisdom, obtained by education and their love for 
knowledge to rule society.
154
 This rule of reason would not necessarily mean equality for the 
law, but the rules laid down would be for the good of society, not for the good of the elite. 
Plato puts it like this: “You have forgotten again, my dear friend” I said, “that this was not 
the purpose of the law that a single section of the community will do exceptionally well, but 
the intention is that this will apply across the whole state (..).”155 
 It has to be observed here that rule of law also does not necessarily entail equality. All 
it asks is that the law is made known before it is enforced. The same tendencies of rule of 
reason that can be found in Plato are visible in the work of Aristotle who also wants the rule 
of the wise. Also the idea of representative democracy tends towards the rule of reason. 
Working with representatives requires only political virtue in the chosen elite.
156
 The people 
do not necessarily have to be politically virtuous. This saves the people a lot of time and, 
when the power is used correctly, gives a “professional product.”157 
A more contemporary thinker who argues along the lines of rule of reason is Joseph 
Raz (1939). For laws to have authority they need to help the citizen to make better decisions 
based on reason. This means that the government balances all the reasons there are, or at least 
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that is what they are supposed to do, so that the citizens do not have to do this themselves. 
The lawmakers reasons are all included in the law and the law should replace those reasons 
for the citizen.
158
 However, when there are reasons that are not being taken into account by 
the lawgiver, the citizen may weigh these reasons. Raz calls this the dependence thesis; “All 
authoritative directives should be based, in the main, on reason which already independently 
apply to the subject of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances 
covered by the directive.”159Contrary to Proudhon, rules that ultimately are not based, would 
still be binding. The whole point of authoritative rules is that they bind even when they are 
wrong.
160
 The legitimacy of the rules however, comes from the balance of reason, and a 
government that often acts contrary to reason, loses its legitimacy.
161
 Proudhon’s ideal laws 
seems to be close to the no difference thesis. This thesis states that the rules should not change 
anything in what the citizen is supposed to do, since the law should only lead in the direction 
of what they ought to do. This is, in fact, not the case. Proudhon’s system still allows for laws 
that solve coordination problems and Prisoner’s Dilemmas. The key concept of authority for 
Raz is that those who are subject to the law are likely to better comply with reason.
162
 
Legitimate authority is very similar to epistemic authority.
163
 Following the law is in your 
own best interest. This is also what laws in Proudhon’s society are supposed to do. 
Good laws alone mean nothing when certain citizens or groups stand above it. Equal 
access to the courts is an important theme for Machiavelli. Without equality for the law, or 
when it is impossible to bring certain individuals to justice, the order in society becomes 
endangered.
164
 The emotions of people are the cause. When they cannot acquire justice they 
will start to express their discontent, while an atmosphere of peace can be created when the 
leaders respect the laws.
165
 This equality before the law is vital to order. 
The way Proudhon approaches the law is only different from the republican tradition 
in the amount of trust he places in science. Proudhon states is as follows: ”Now, what is it to 
recognize a law? It is to verify a mathematical or metaphysical calculation; it is to repeat an 
experiment, to observe a phenomenon, to establish a fact.”166 One might object that those 
who write the law are the sovereigns. This is not what Proudhon has in mind. The 
Pythagorean formula derives its authority from it being tested and true, not from Pythagoras. 
The laws of society need to be made in the same way.  
Where the republican tradition places its trust in the selected few to make the law 
(while also be subject to it), Proudhon places his trust in any individual who happens to be 
right. Every citizen is equally lawmaker and subject to the law. How Proudhon would respond 
to scientifically tested laws that require inequality is unknown.
167
 Since the idea of equality is 
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strengthened by the transformation of property and the federalist mutualist state, inequality for 
the law might be considered less problematic. Keeping in mind that all laws correspond with 
reason. 
 
3.3 Property 
In the republican tradition Proudhon’s ideas about property are rarely welcomed. 
Republicanism often knows strict property rights. However, Proudhon’s distrust towards 
property is not new in the republican tradition. Similar notions can be found in Cicero and 
also Locke’s and Nozick’s ideas about occupation show similarities with Proudhon. Locke’s 
idea about the foundation of property is very different from Proudhon, since Proudhon only 
allows possession. Locke bases his theory on the foundation of property on labor and 
occupation. For Locke property is created when a man mixes his labor in a product or when 
he occupies a good that belongs to no one else (picking wild berries). Locke holds that nature 
is given to men as a whole and that thus simple occupancy is not enough to establish a right of 
property.
168
 The right of property comes when one has mixed his labor in the product (land 
included).
169
 Proudhon rejects the idea of property being based on labor but his ideas about 
the limits of property are similar. Locke’s idea about the limitation of property is based on 
“enough and as good”.170 This means every human being can occupy the goods and land he 
wants (as long as he mixes his labor with it) but he cannot occupy more than that which he 
needs. Locke states it as follows: “He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled; 
else he took more then his share, and robb’d others.”171He can occupy enough, that which he 
needs to live, nothing more; “nothing was made by God for men to spoil or destroy.”172 
While doing that he also needs to leave enough for others, and of the same quality he took. 
This idea is based on the tragedy of the commons. When a land is held in common, no one has 
an incentive to take care of it. It is similar to the free-rider problem, only in this case everyone 
wants to be the free-rider. By making property private, the owner has incentive to take care of 
it. When properly taken care for, the fruits will be his. When the piece of land is properly 
cultivated, mankind as a whole will be better off.
173
 Locke explains it as follows: “To which 
let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but increase 
the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of human life, 
produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compasse) 
ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre of Land, of an equal richnesse, 
lyeing waste in common.”174 Keeping in mind that spoilage is not allowed, the greater 
production of the land will benefit society as a whole, not just the owner. 
This theory has problems with goods that are finite in character (and most goods are). 
It is impossible to occupy everything the earth has to offer from those goods, since you do not 
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leave enough and as good for others. If the last unit cannot be occupied for that reason the 
same goes for the second last unit, etc. Following this theory through, nothing can ever be 
appropriated since you cannot leave others equal opportunity.
175
 The notion of not taking 
more goods than one needs is an important similarity with Proudhon. The key difference 
between their ideas is that Proudhon does not accept property as anything more than 
possession, while Locke does. The apple picked by a servant still belongs to the master.
176
 For 
Locke the protection of property is one of the reasons men create a state in the first place, 
while Proudhon wants to get rid of both. 
 Just like Proudhon and Locke, Cicero believes that the natural world is given to the 
entire human species.
177
 His idea of private property is much closer to Proudhon’s ideas about 
possession then the current vision on property. Property, according to Cicero, comes from 
taking first possession and holding it for a long time, from conquest of war, due process of 
law, bargain, purchase and allotment.
178
 For Cicero it is a crime against society to have more 
property then necessary, and everyone has a duty to share with others. This duty is even more 
pressing when there is no cost involved in sharing.
179
 Cicero limits the scope of property to 
need, and imposes a duty on property owners to share when they are capable of doing so. For 
Cicero also, human beings are associated and connected with each other. Just like Proudhon, 
Cicero does not allow for the accumulation of wealth beyond need. Cicero puts the right use 
of property as follows: “Only let it, in the first place, be honestly acquired, by the use of no 
dishonest and fraudulent means; let it, in the second place, increase with wisdom industry, 
and thrift; and, finally, let it be made available for the use of as many as possible (if only they 
are worthy) and be at the service of generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality and 
excess.”180 
 Cicero’s ideas about the state are linked to his idea about property. The word republic 
comes from the words res and publica, which means the public thing.
181
 Cicero holds that 
man is a political animal, and that the republic is the common good of the people.
182
 The 
republican is their property. In the republic men are united by a certain kindliness and 
goodwill. This comes from the shared partnership of all men in justice.
183
 Though Cicero 
follows Polybius in his political thought on the formation of the state, and thus favors a mixed 
constitution, this notion of the state as belonging to the people, is not very different from 
Proudhon.
184
  
Cicero, a republican thinker, does not support property the way it is used today. 
Proudhon advances on Cicero’s ideas about property. When it comes to the state the two have 
very different views, but their core is similar. Both find the foundation of society in the 
people. Where Cicero calls the republic the property of the people, in Proudhon’ state the state 
and the people are one.   
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 Unlike Cicero, Locke and Proudhon, Nozick does not believe in a natural communism 
where the earth belongs to men as a whole. Nature has no owner, so no special right is needed 
to defend appropriation. The fruits of the world are res nullius, belonging to no one else. 
However, also for Nozick there are limitations. When appropriating a good, one cannot leave 
the rest worse off than they were before.
185
  
Private property as the excommunication of the rest of mankind does not meet the 
ideal of Cicero, it is contrary to enough and as good and it does leave others worse of. This is 
even more clear when the property is not used by the proprietor but by the worker who pays 
rent (or interest when capital is involved) for the use of it. 
 The right to charge interest derives from the notion of property. More specifically the 
right of usufruct. Though also not a classical republican topic, the aversion to interest is not 
strange to republican thinkers. Aristotle, when discussing the right and the wrong use of 
money, calls interest the unnatural way of using money.
186
 Money is, and should be, used to 
facilitate business and trade by making buying and selling easier.
187
 Creating money with 
money and not with labor is unnatural. Aristotle continues later in his work that nothing noble 
can come from something unnatural.
188
 
 Machiavelli also hints at a distrust of interest. Though he does not mention it directly, 
he criticizes in strong terms the noble elite who gain wealth without laboring. They are the 
root of evil, and the source of conflict.
189
 
In conclusion, Proudhon can be seen to advance the republican notion of freedom from 
oppression from the government to domination the civil sphere by property. His ideas about 
the state are different from the traditional republican approach but it is possible to interpret 
them within the lines of republican thought. Although property and interest are not classical 
republican subjects, republican thinkers are worried about them none the less. Proudhon 
enriches the republican tradition by developing these themes further. 
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4 Anarchistic virtues 
What’s wrong with republicanism? 
The relation between a monarch and a servant is similar to the relation between the proprietor 
and the worker.
190
 The republican tradition has focused on the first part of the problem, the 
relation between ruler and subject, and has neglected the second relation. In order to create 
freedom, the institution of property has to be rethought as well. This idea becomes clearer 
when the instruction of slavery is observed. All the republican thinkers mentioned in chapter 
1, were familiar with slavery. The ideas they developed to prevent the state from preying on 
its own people did nothing to protect the slaves. Under the rule of law in Athens and the 
United States slavery was permitted. The domination over slaves was not stopped by the 
separation of powers. Nor did decentralization bring freedom to the slaves. The classical 
republican virtues left a lot of work to be done. There is a lot more to domination than state 
oppression. When Proudhon is placed in the republican tradition he advances the tradition in 
the direction of other-than-state domination. Proudhon sought to republicanize property and to 
destroy the domination relations that exist in it.
191
 
4.1 What can we learn from anarchism? The nature of men. 
To be able to learn from the anarchistic ideas of Proudhon, they need to be put to the test. His 
banishment of the state as we know it, depends on his idea that men no longer need the state. 
Men have evolved above the savages and can live in peace without the common power to 
keep us all in awe.  
 Let’s, for the sake of argument, first assume that Proudhon is right. That men, when 
released from institutions as property, interest and the state would turn into angels. Would 
those angels need government? Kavka, claims the answer to this question is: yes, even angels 
need government. It is important to note that Kavka’s angels remain fully human in the sense 
that they are not perfect.
192
 They are not transcendent winged entities, but humans of flesh and 
bone. In Kavka’s definition an angel is a human being with a consistent set of moral beliefs. 
The angel is morally conscious and always acts on his beliefs. To Kavka’s definition I would 
like to add a love for fellow human beings (human decency), to make sure that 
Thrasymachus-like moral belief systems cannot be called angelic. A moral system that says: 
“whatever the strong and powerful do is good”, when acted upon by a human, does not 
produce an angel. This does however, not change the rest of Kavka’s analysis. 
Even with a consistent moral belief system, these angels still need government on the 
grounds that there are conflicts that they cannot solve without the help of government. Kavka 
comes to this conclusion by analyzing four types of conflict that requires a government to 
solve them. In the first place, angels can disagree about the facts. Whether something is 
broken, or violated, may not be clear.
193
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 Second, Kavka notes, that given moral pluralism, angels will come into conflict about 
morally difficult issues like abortion or euthanasia.
194
 It might be impossible to find out which 
angels are right and therefore they need government to solve the issue.  
Thirdly, Prisoners’ Dilemmas and coordination problems will arise in a society of 
angels.
195
 Even with perfect moral belief systems there may not be a crucial reason to, for 
example, drive on the right or left side of the road. These problems do however need to be 
addressed, and addressed centrally. 
In the fourth place motivated belief may be a source of conflict.
196
 Angels, acting on 
these beliefs, think they are morally right while others do not need to share those beliefs. This 
is also a potential source of conflict. 
Kavka concludes that these four problems constitute a need for government. Even 
morally perfect citizens need a government. Proudhon can however object that his federal 
mutualist state can provide the services needed to combat these issues. The natural groups can 
transfer these limited powers to a public organ that takes care of them. There are still laws in 
Proudhon’s anarchy. Angels do not necessarily need government, but a public body that has 
the authority to make decisions in certain cases. Proudhon’s anarchy survives the charges 
from Kavka. 
Angels might not need government to live in harmony, but men are not as morally 
perfect as angels. Is it possible for men to live without government? Many claim the power of 
sword is needed to keep men from inflicting all kinds of injustice on each other. Does human 
nature require a government to be held at bay, or is humanity corrupted by society?  
The idea that man is corrupted by society is featured in Rousseau’s work. Rousseau 
argues that: “THE first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of 
saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of 
civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and 
misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the 
ditch, and crying to his fellows, "Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you 
once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to 
nobody."”197Proudhon expands on Rousseau’s ideas. When private property and interest 
belong to the past, a more sociable man arises.  
Does this abandoning of property stop conflicts in society that need the power of the 
sword to be dealt with? According to Hobbes there are three reasons why men in the state of 
nature, where there is no power of the sword, come into conflict with each other. In the first 
place because of competition. Men have need of various resources and most of these 
resources are finite in character.
198
 Knowing that this is the case, each individual will try to 
get enough, or more, of those resources. When necessary, they take the goods at the cost of a 
fellow human being. This creates distrust, dissidence, among men. All men know that that the 
other is a potential threat. The first one to strike is the person with the best chances to obtain 
                                                          
194
 Kavka,  Why even morally perfect people would need government, p. 4. 
195
 Kavka,  Why even morally perfect people would need government, p. 5. 
196
 Kavka,  Why even morally perfect people would need government, p. 6. 
197
 Rousseau, A discourse on the origin of inequality, p. 40. 
198
 Newey, The Routledge Guidebook to Hobbes, p. 86. 
 
27 
the resources, so all humans will be on constant alert.
199
 This will constitute a constant state of 
war between all individuals. War is not only the violence that it features, but also the constant 
threat thereof.
200
 The third reason for conflict does not have much to do with material 
resources. It is glory, the need for a good reputation, or the power of your ambition. Glory 
drove Macbeth to kill the king; “To prick the sides of my intent, but only Vaulting ambition, 
which o’erleaps itself, And falls on th’other.”201 The three reasons for conflict are: 
competition, dissidence and glory.
202
 
Only the first two of the Hobbesian reasons for conflict have a material component. 
When Proudhon wants to better man by abandoning property and interest he is targeting these 
two sources of conflict. Now even if he were to be successful in combatting these two 
sources, there would still be a third source for conflict, namely glory. From this source of 
conflict arises the need for the power of the sword. 
 According to Machiavelli, any ruler that deserves the name, needs to make the 
laws while bearing in mind that men are naturally inclined to do evil.
203
 Glory definitely plays 
a part here. When men stop fighting out of necessity, they will fight to gain glory.
204
 Men’s 
nature is so, that it can want all, but never achieve all. There is a never-ending urge in men to 
gain glory. In The Prince Machiavelli states it as follows: “For this may be said of men 
generally: they are ungrateful, fickle, feigners and dissemblers, avoiders of danger, eager for 
gain.”205Machiavelli does not suggest how to change men for the better, besides that religion 
and political virtue have a positive effect on social order.
206
 From his writings it is clear that 
any ruler or system should be prepared to deal with evil. 
Another thinker who heavily criticizes the idea that men can be changed for the better 
is Nietzsche. Nietzsche does not believe in human equality, but in the rule of the übermensch. 
As long as the übermenschen make up the ruling class, society will be peaceful.
207
 Nietzsche 
puts it as follows: “ Want mijn broeders, het beste moet heersen, het beste wil ook heersen! 
En waar de leer anders luidt daar – ontbreekt het beste.”208 The workers will be content with 
their share in life and so will the rulers.
209
 
According to Nietzsche equality is absurd and wrong. He calls the prophets of equality 
tarantulas, expressing his disgust.
210
 Humans, the prophets of equality included, are driven by 
a will to power. The will to be power lies in their nature. Nietzsche believes that the human 
nature is wretched and that this wretchedness is part of life and therefore needs to be 
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embraced.
211
 When a thinker claims that the nature of men is fully good he has forgotten the 
darkness within his own soul. As Shakespeare put it: “To know my deed, ‘twere best not know 
myself.”212 
Nietzsche is not willing to forget and does not believe in humans being fully good. 
Humans are not a blank sheet that can be programmed by their surroundings (at least not 
fully). Freud also hammers at this. Institutions like property can indeed be problematic but 
taking those away does not change the nature of mankind. Human nature, its id, is described 
by Freud as: “People are, in reality, bubbling cauldrons of violent and sexual desire waiting 
to boil over.”213 Human aggressiveness will find a way to express itself.  
In Freud’s mind, for socialism to work, the wants of the egoistic person need to be 
known. In the second place they need to be fulfilled.
214
 While socialism focusses primarily on 
the material side it is questionable that this can settle all the wants of the person.  There is a 
psychological side to the problem which material gain cannot solve, since not all wants are 
materialistic in character.
215
 Freud would reject socialism, and from his analysis it is very 
probable that he would also reject anarchism.
216
 The fear of the sword, in Freud’s terms, the 
father, is necessary for an orderly society.
217
 
Both Freud and Nietzsche do not believe in a will of the masses.
218
 They would both 
reject the public me, or general will. The only way these concepts are used is as a disguise for 
the user’s own will to power. The ones claiming to defend the rights of others are just trying 
to better or consolidate their position.
219
  
While a bit more optimistic than Freud and Nietzsche towards the capabilities of 
institutions to better men, Plato is also worried about the nature of men. According to Plato 
men easily fall into a less virtuous version of themselves. His idea about the soul of man is 
analogous with his idea about the decline of states. Humans are easily led by the hydra in their 
souls.
220
 Only the best of the best are capable of being guided by wisdom. 
Plato does however see a corrupting element in the institution of property. His 
guardians, the second best, cannot own private property.
221
 This is to keep them focused on 
their one goal in life; the protection of the polis. Not allowing the guardians property is a way 
to prevent them from preying upon the citizens they are supposed to protect.
222
 Property has a 
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corrupting effect on the souls of the guardians and also plays a fundamental part in the decline 
of the soul of the timocrat towards the oligarch. 
To be fair to Proudhon, he does not claim to be able to take away all reasons for 
conflict. Nor that can be turned into angels. He only argues that men can live without 
government and the power of the sword.  He anticipates conflict with his idea about balancing 
natural groups. Proudhon’s theory will still be fine as long as he is capable of dealing with the 
wretched nature of mankind. His political philosophy does not need angels to work, but it 
needs to be capable of working with evil tendencies in human beings. 
 
4.2 Government 
Since Proudhon has a more optimistic view of human nature, his political system lies open for 
criticism from that direction. Does his political system still hold when confronted with a more 
pessimistic notion of human nature. How can potentially bad people, selecting potentially bad 
people, result in freedom? A system of direct democracies is, without defensive mechanisms 
for the nature of mankind, open to all kinds of attacks. In the history of philosophy the 
democratic system has been widely criticized. These criticisms start with Plato.  
 For Plato, democracy is only one step away from chaos. This is because the 
atmosphere of democracy will be reflected in everyday life.
223
 The atmosphere is equality 
makes authority something to be avoided. All citizens will try to make their opinion heard 
even when they have no knowledge of the issues at hand. This will lead to disaster. The only 
people the citizens will follow are demagogues who tell the people what they want to hear. 
Plutarch describes it as such: “This man, (..)took that ordinary course towards usurpation of 
absolute power, namely to gain the multitude, (..).”224The spirit of equality will rob 
government from its capabilities to lead and place it in the hands of people who are good 
speakers, but bad leaders.
225
 
 To combat this, Plato has an important role for education in mind.
226
 All citizens will 
be trained in sports, music, math and philosophy. Though the people with no skill in these 
matters gradually drop out, the part of the population that is supposed to lead will complete 
the course.
227
 During their education the students will be placed in all parts of society to gain 
valuable experience. The key idea behind this education is gain knowledge of good and evil 
and being able to apply this when it is their turn to rule.
228
 
 Platonic love also has a role to play. Love will drive people to better versions of 
themselves. Love goes out to things the person lacks, but wants. At first they will love one 
body, then two, then all beautiful bodies. From this point one starts to love virtue, science and 
eventually the science that only has beauty as its object.
229
 Like good and evil, beauty is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Juvenalis,  Satires,  VI. 347.. 
223
 Plato, The Republic, 558 C. 
224
 Plutarch, Lives, p. 177. Camillus. 
225
 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, p. 169. Socrates 38. The speeches written to condemn 
Socrates to death were written by sophist.  
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, p. 175. Socrates 46. The death of Socrates robbed the citizens 
of Athens from their wisest. Society pays the price for their demagogues.  
226
 Plato, The Republic, 541 B. 
227
 Plato, The Republic, 540 A. 
228
 Plato, The Republic, 480 A 
229
 Plato, Symposion, 211C, p. 666. 
 
30 
platonic form.
230
 The highest form of love, is love for these forms. Socrates is quoted to have 
said: “There is, he said, only one good, that is knowledge, and only one evil, that is, 
ignorance; wealth and good birth bring their possessor no dignity, but on the contrary 
evil.”231 For Plato, knowledge about the form ‘good’ gives you reason to act accordingly.232 
 Although Plato does not believe that democracy can be a workable system, it is 
possible to view education and love as stabilizing factors, even for a democracy. 
 Aristotle follows Plato in the importance of education. The education of young men is 
vital to the state. Since no man should be ruled by their lesser, it is crucial that citizens will 
become the best they can be. For that reason Aristotle wants to educate the people. An 
important difference between Plato and Aristotle is the scope of their education project. Plato 
includes all the inhabitants of the polis while Aristotle only wants to educate the citizens. This 
means that slaves and woman are excluded while Plato wants to include them. 
 The Aristotelian education serves the same role as in Plato. It is to make sure that the 
polis has good leaders and to protect the citizens from demagogues. It provides citizens with 
knowledge and teaches them to be virtuous.
233
 Virtue in Aristotle is different from Plato. 
Aristotle holds that virtue needs to be practiced in order to work. Knowing what is virtuous is 
not enough.
234
 Virtues need to become character traits through extensive exercise and 
education.
235
 Besides the goal of virtue, education also serves to support friendship. True 
friendship is, according to Aristotle, only possible between equals.
236
 This friendship goes out 
to the virtue of the friend. It is a reflection of the virtues found in oneself.
237
 Since Aristotle 
wants its citizens to be the best, and the ideal polis is like a brotherhood of friends, it is 
necessary to educate. 
 While Friendship, love and education can arm the people against demagogues and 
prepares them to be leaders in the future, it does not arm against all problems a democracy 
can face. 
 Alexis de Tocqueville describes two problematic tendencies that democracy in his 
view has. In the first place a democracy tends towards soft despotism. This is because men, in 
a democracy, tend to be more individualistic. While only caring about their little world, they 
will not care for the world and people around them. Because these things still need to be taken 
care of, the government will fill the hole. This will lead to big government.
238
 While doing so, 
it will encroach upon the private sphere of the individual. Democracies tend towards 
becoming welfare states. The problem is described by Barry Goldwater as follows: “(..) that if 
we take from a man  the personal responsibility for caring for his material needs, we take 
                                                          
230
 Plato, Faidros, 248A 
231
 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, p. 161. Socrates 31. 
232
 Korsgaard, The sources of normativity, p. 37. Korsgaard quotes Mackey, who, in his argument from 
queerness, ridicules platonic forms because of the to-be-doneness that is built into them. 
233
 Aristotle, Politica, 1338 A 10 
234
 Aristotle,  Ethica Nichomache, p.236.  Book IX, chapter 9-2. “Vandaar dat kennis van het optimaal 
functioneren niet voldoende is, maar we moeten het ons proberen eigen te maken en in praktijk zien te brengen, 
tenzij we op andere manieren goed kunnen worden.”  
235
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War,  p. 163.Clausewitz’s education has similar tendencies as Aristotle. “It will light 
his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfall.” 
236
 Aristotle,  Ethica Nichomachea, p.236.  Book VIII, chapter 3-5 
237
 Aristotle,  Ethica Nichomachea, p.236.  Book IX, chapter 4-1 
238
 Ron Paul,  Liberty Defined, p. 63. “The trouble with democracy is not so much its workings at any one time; 
the trouble is the dynamic it sets in place that gradually changes a small government into a big one.” 
 
31 
from him also the will and the opportunity to be free.”239 Because the very same people that 
are being pampered also have the power to choose their representatives the problem gets 
worse. How are they supposed to choose the right representatives?
240
 
 The second problematic tendency is the formation of tyrannical majorities. Tyrannical 
majorities are problematic in two distinct fashions. In the first place in the lawmaking process 
when minorities do not have the influence to stop the majority. The majority writes the law 
and can easily tyrannize minority groups. The problem lies in the wrong interpretation of 
democracy.
241
 Democracy means the rule of the people, which in principle means making 
unanimous decisions.
242
 In practice this is nearly (if not completely) impossible on almost all 
cases. As a second best the majority rule is in place.
243
 This compromise however means that 
minorities are in danger of becoming oppressed. They are not capable of stopping the majority 
from making the most horrible rules.
244
 
 The second  place where the tyranny of the majority makes itself felt is in thought. 
Mill calls this the tyranny of the prevailing opinion.
245
 It is here that the tyranny of majority is 
most dangerous. No dictator can really get inside the minds of their subjects, but a tyrannical 
majority can.
246
In the words of Tocqueville: “In Amerika trekt de meerderheid een geweldige 
cirkel om het denken heen. Binnen de cirkel is de schrijver vrij, maar wee hem die de grens 
dreigt te overschrijden.”247The punishment for going against the current is social exile. This 
means the loss of friends, not being able to gain a position of power nor the gaining of glory. 
This means that most writers will not publish against the prevailing opinion, even when their 
words are true. This is a big social loss. 
 This social loss becomes clearer when the work of Daniel Gilbert is taken into 
account. According to Gilbert men will, at first, believe everything they read.
248
 This is 
necessary in order to understand what is read. There is no neutrality towards information. 
When reading information, all information that comes in, will be believed no matter the 
content. In the second stage the information is tested against the information that is already 
present. When the process of the second stage fails or is disrupted, information will be 
believed without checking it. There are multiple reasons why the second stage can fail. When 
certain information is not published for fear of social retribution, the people will lack this 
information to test against. It is vital for any society that its citizens create a filter of good 
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information to check the information they receive.
249
 Citizens also need the will to use their 
filter and think critically.
250
 Believing goes automatically, while critical thinking requires 
exercise and effort.
251
 Otherwise nothing stops them from believing the biggest lies. When the 
tyranny of the prevailing opinion prevents information from reaching the public, the chances 
grow that the public gets stuck in dogmatism. Unsurprisingly, education is very important for 
Tocqueville as well. 
Tocqueville also points to the value of religion in society. In democracy especially it is 
very valuable as a counter mechanism to individualism. Religion will bind people together 
and unites them in the pursuit of a higher goal. In the same way the tyranny of the prevailing 
opinion works to prevent certain thoughts, religion prevents immoral action; “En zo staat de 
wet het Amerikaanse volk toe alles te doen, terwijl de religie het tegelijkertijd verbiedt alles te 
denken en het verbiedt alles te durven.”252 Religious beliefs and education are the prime tools 
for keeping the demagogues at bay. 
Plato, Aristotle and Alexis de Tocqueville all do not believe in the separation of 
powers. As stabilizing factors for democracy they recognize, education, love and friendship. 
In addition Tocqueville also notes religion, the federative form of government and lawyers as 
stabilizing components of society. They recognize individualism, dogmatism (tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion), demagogues and lack of education/knowledge as destabilizing. Whether 
these stabilizing elements are enough to stabilize the federation Proudhon has in mind, is not 
clear. Proudhon himself interestingly enough does not believe that organized religion has a 
positive influence.
253
 The church, just like the state, is a system of domination.
254
 The people 
have been made to pay and pray, and are sick of it. In place of organized religion he has 
education in philosophy in mind. Education should be open to all members of society. For 
Proudhon education needs to be linked to the workshop. If it would not be linked to the 
workshop one would be creating masters in the workplace.
255
 This is something Proudhon 
tries to avoid. To make sure education is linked to the workshop education will take the form 
of apprenticeship.
256
 Besides this apprenticeship the student will follow philosophy lessons 
for one hour a week for six years.
257
 The education is not completely free from religious 
virtues. Philosophy will teach students to reverse the seven deadly sins (wrath, greed, sloth, 
pride, envy and gluttony) into virtuous character traits.
258
 Proudhon does not believe that the 
church is a force for good, but does support the values of religion. Religion in itself is an 
organic affair in that it belongs to human beings.
259
 Religion itself is not a bad thing, just the 
domination relations that have grown from it. In this respect both education and religion are 
present in Proudhon’s anarchy. Both are, in the Proudhonian form, free from centralization 
and domination. 
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Proudhon would not be the first to try and stabilize democracy. Though history 
developed in the direction of separation of powers it is unknown whether the banishment of 
property and interest in combination with the above mentioned stabilizers would provide for a 
stable direct democracy. In order for his federation to work, Proudhon needs to be prepared 
for the evil in human beings. His direct democratic system that is deployed within the natural 
groups, needs to be able to combat them. Whether religion, love and education are enough to 
do this, remains an open question. Proudhon does have one safety mechanism in place. In his 
direct democracies the chosen leaders are directly responsible to their electorate. They can at 
any moment be put out of service. This would stress the importance of education. Only 
educated citizens can handle the power to govern. To govern is to predict. Only educated 
citizens are capable of seeing their long term interests and are capable of selecting the right 
leaders. It is the reverse of what Nietzsche claims when he says; “If one wants slaves, then 
one is a fool if one educates them to be masters.”260 In the same way, if you want direct 
democracy to work, or when you want the citizens to be able to rule themselves, they need to 
be educated. If one wants masters, then one is a fool not to educate them. Proudhon wants 
masters, not of men, but over their own life’s, so they won’t need government. 
Federalist mutualism, combined with the above mentioned safety mechanism, may 
provide an interesting alternative form of state. Originally the number of possible forms for 
the state is six.
261
 The rule of the one, monarchy and tyranny. The rule of the few, aristocracy 
and oligarchy. And the rule of all, democracy and ochlocracy. Proudhon would add the rule of 
none. The good version, anarchy (federative mutualism), while the bad version would be 
chaos (anarchy in the original sense of the word). While the last version could not be called a 
state the first one can. Proudhon adds one more possible form of state to the traditional 
scheme. That is an achievement on its own. 
 
4.3 The consequences 
When anarchy can be admitted to the list of possible good forms of government who are not 
necessarily corrupted, then this has far-reaching consequences for republicanism. At the core 
of the republican tradition of separation of powers, of Trias Politica, stands the theory of 
Polybius. Polybius favors the mixed constitution of Rome because to him it was clear, that the 
best constitution is a constitution that partakes in all the good forms of government.
262
 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Madison all build upon this theory. When anarchy is 
considered a good form of government, it needs to be included in the mixed constitution. This 
will entrench the relationship between anarchy and republicanism. Proudhon’s anarchism will 
not just be connected with republicanism because it shares in many of its themes, it must be 
merged within the republican notion of the mixed constitution. 
 This means the republican tradition needs to make work of themes like property and 
interest. It means it has to take decentralization even more serious. It also means, that if wants 
to build a state according to the model of the mixed constitution some anarchic elements need 
to be included. Proudhon’s political philosophy may prove to be very useful in state-building 
projects like the European Union. The situation that the European nation-states are in, is very 
                                                          
260
 Nicholas Buccola, The Tyranny of the Least and the Dumbest, p. 14. 
261
 With a mixed constitution and timocracy bringing the total to 8 and Proudhon’s anarchy bringing it to 9. 
262
 Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius, Book 6, p. 350. 
 
34 
similar to the relations that the natural groups would have in Proudhon’s anarchy. This means 
Proudhon’s political theory is alive and well and has interesting road laying ahead of it. 
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Conclusion 
Proudhon’s anarchy is not what men traditionally have in mind when confronted with the 
term. It is not a situation of chaos. Proudhon’s anarchy envisions a society that is ruled by 
reason, that has no central power and where men are free from oppression from the state and 
from property. 
To answer the question: how can freedom be defended from tyranny within the modern 
state from an anarchic perspective?, it is vital to include domination relations within the state 
into thinking about freedom. From the perspective of Proudhon this means that property needs 
to be replaced by possession, that interest, usury, needs to be banished and that government 
needs to be as decentralized as possible. Property needs to be republicanized to prevent the 
misuse of the concept. 
Although Proudhon has a unique system that would separate him from other thinkers, 
his work features plenty of republican themes. Proudhon does, just like the classical 
republican thinkers, believe in the rule of law. Unlike the republican tradition he sees the law 
as a product of science. From the perspective of freedom from authority this gives the 
advantage that every citizen is a lawgiver and all laws are in line with reason. 
Decentralization is a key concept in both Proudhon and the republican tradition. It is 
vital to keep as much power in the hands of the individuals as possible. This limits the 
possibilities of the central government to act despotic.  Proudhon wants to decentralize even 
further than the republicans by dividing power over as many natural groups as possible. There 
is no central government to turn despotic. 
A key difference between Proudhon and the republican tradition is his disbelief in the 
separation of powers. Proudhon places sovereignty in the hands of individuals and this power 
has no need to be separated. The power of a government need to be separated, but the power 
of an individual does not. 
Proudhon’s ideas rest on a positive view of human nature. Good institutions can 
change men for the better. Though it is not necessary for his political views that human beings 
are naturally good, he still needs to handle the elite problem. Proudhon’s solution to this 
problem lies in the direct responsibility of leaders to the electorate and the balancing of 
natural groups. When combined with classical republican values like education, religion and 
political virtue, direct democracy might be a workable concept. In this way Proudhon adds his 
anarchic state to the classical scheme of six possible state forms. When admitted as a viable 
form of state it will make its way into the mixed constitution, thus entrenching itself into the 
republican tradition. 
When it comes to political philosophy Proudhon is ready for a revival. There are good 
reasons to take his philosophy very seriously. State building projects like European Union can 
benefit from his work. When interpreted in a republican light, rather than in an anarchic 
setting, his political ideas are shown to be promising. His philosophy might get a second life 
in the republican tradition. 
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